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1. INTRODUCTION
Justice White's prophetic statement in Batson v. Kentucky' that
"[m]uch litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the
Court's equal protection holding today ... ." has been realized.
Since the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bat-
son, 3 which prohibited the state's use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude members of the defendant's race from the jury on account of
their race, hundreds of cases have come before appellate courts in an
effort to clarify the nuances of that holding and obtain answers to sev-
I. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
3. 476 U.S. 79.
1
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eral important questions left open by Batson." For example, in Her-
nandez v. New York, 5 one of the more recent Batson cases to come
before the United States Supreme Court,6 the Court considered how
4. Brief for Respondent at 46, Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)
(No. 89-7645) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judging by the number of
Batson claims that have made their way even as far as this Court . . . it is a certainty
that the amount of judges' and lawyers' time devoted to implementing today's newly
discovered Law of the Land will be enormous."); see also Bonnie L. Mayfield, Batson
and Groups Other than Blacks: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
377 (1988); Steven W. Fisher, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A "Batson
Update", N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1. For one of the most recent comments on
the deluge of Batson cases, see David 0. Stewart, Whither Peremptories?, A.B.A. J.,
July 1991, at 38, 42 ("[W]ith many more [Batson cases] working their way through
the lower courts, one state-court judge calls the possibilities for Batson claims 'abso-
lutely limitless' . . . . [T]he notable feature of Batson is just how many additional
issues it keeps spawning.").
The issues on those Batson cases working their way through the courts have been
varied. See, e.g., Mayfield, supra at 379-80 & n.24; see also Connecticut v. Gonzalez,
538 A.2d 210 (Conn. 1988); New York v. Jenkins, 554 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1990) (stat-
ing what factors would be considered in determining whether a prima facie case of
discrimination had been made); Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987); Slappy
v. Florida, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 522 So. 2d 18, cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) (what would constitute an acceptable race-neutral expla-
nation sufficient to rebut the inference of purposeful discrimination); United States v.
De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); New York v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App.
Div. 1990) (whether Batson should be extended beyond racial discrimination to bar
gender discrimination); Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991); De Gross, 913 F.2d at
1425; Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (whether a defendant has third party standing to
object to a race based peremptory challenge if the defendant is not of the same race as
the challenged juror).
Edmonson, decided by the Supreme Court on June 3, 1991, presented the issue of
whether Batson would prohibit parties in a civil case from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2079. It also
triggered, indirectly, the question of whether Batson would prohibit the defense as well
as the prosecution from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of
race. Id. at 2096 (Scalia, J., predicting in his dissenting opinion that the effect of Ed-
monson will be to prevent defendants from using race-based peremptory strikes, a con-
clusion already reached by the New York Court of Appeals in New York v. Kern, 554
N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990)). See generally James 0.
Pearson, Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Be-
longing to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (Supp. 1990).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), affg 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990), affg 528
N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1988).
6. In the six month period from January to June 1991, three Batson cases have
been heard by the Supreme Court: Powers, 11l S. Ct. at 1364; Hernandez, Ill S. Ct.
1568 [Vol. 16
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broadly the concept of race should be defined for equal protection pur-
poses.7 The defendant, Hernandez, argued that the court should treat
proficiency in Spanish as a surrogate for race, 8 in analyzing the ques-
tion of "[w]hether a prosecutor's proffered explanation that prospective
Latino jurors were struck from the venire because he suspected they
might not abide by official translations of Spanish language testimony
constitutes an acceptable "race neutral" explanation under Batson v.
Kentucky?"9 A secondary issue raised by Hernandez is the degree of
deference owed by reviewing courts to a trial court's acceptance of the
prosecutor's race neutral explanation.'0
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority in Hernandez, held
that the prosecutor offered a race-neutral basis for his peremptory
strikes, because the prosecutor's stated reason did not include an intent
to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors." Furthermore, the prosecutor's
stated reason for excluding the jurors was not based on stereotypical
assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals. 12 Giving great deference to
the factual findings of the trial court, the majority held that the trial
court did not commit clear error in finding a lack of intent to discrimi-
nate and in accepting the prosecutor's explanation.'" However, Justice
Kennedy, in an attempt to limit the Court's holding to its facts, cau-
tioned that the Court's decision "does not imply that exclusion of bil-
inguals from jury service is wise, or even that it is constitutional in all
cases," 4 and that a prosecutor who strikes all potential jurors who
speak a given language, in the absence of any trial related circum-
stances or individual responses of the jurors, may be found to be in
violation of the equal protection clause under Batson."3 In a strongly
worded dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Mar-
at 1859; and Edmonson, I1I S. Ct. 2077.
7. Hernandez, 11I S. Ct. at 1872 (Justice Kennedy stating that this decision did
not "resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race
should be defined for equal protection purposes.").
8. Id. at 1866.
9. Brief for Petitioner at i, Hernandez v. New York, Il1 S. Ct. 1859 (1991)
(No. 89-7645) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]; see also Brief for Respondent, supra
note 4, at i.
10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at i; Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, ati.
11. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1869-71.
14. Id. at 1872.
15. Id. at 1873.
1992] 1569
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shall, set forth three reasons for the view that the prosecutor's explana-
tion was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of intentional dis-
crimination: first, the disparate impact was evidence of discriminatory
intent, rendering the prosecutor's explanation a pretext; second, less
drastic means than excluding the bilingual jurors were available to ac-
commodate the prosecutor's stated concern; and third, if the prosecu-
tor's concern was legitimate and capable of being documented, a chal-
lenge for cause would have been warranted. 16 The impact on the public
was immediately addressed as newspapers around the nation carried
the day after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hernandez. Headlines in
three major newspapers read: "Justices see no bias in trial barring bi-
lingual jurors,"' 7 "Supreme Court broadens exclusion of bilingual ju-
rors," 18 and "High court cites basis to reject bilingual jurors."' 9 In all
communities the Hernandez ruling has great impact, because a bilin-
gual juror with proficiency in the language of the non-English speaking
witness or defendant could be excluded on the basis of the explanation
that he or she might not accept the official interpretation. But in heav-
ily bilingual communities, such as South Florida, the impact is even
greater because the jury pools in bilingual communities are more apt to
be heavily bilingual, thus increasing the number of prospective jurors
that could be excluded. Also, the probability is greater that a trial will
involve one or more individuals who do not speak English and will re-
16. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1991, (Nat'l/Foreign), at 10 (city ed.). Although
the article as a whole was very objective, the initial impact on readers was the impres-
sion that the high court had given its approval to the barring of bilingual jurors. Id.
18. SEATTLE TIMES, May 29, 1991, at A2 (final ed.). The article characterized
the 6-3 ruling as one which will give prosecutors greater power to "keep bilingual mi-
norities off juries in criminal trials." Id.
19. MIAMI HERALD, May 29, 1991, at Al, col. 4 [hereinafter High Court Cites
Basis]. The article began, "[in a ruling that could make it easier to bar bilingual
people from juries, the Supreme Court Tuesday upheld a prosecutor's exclusion of His-
panics on grounds that they might not accept official English translations of testimony
in Spanish." Id. Both the headline and the text carried the message that the increas-
ingly conservative Court had found a legal basis to back its decision to deliver yet
another blow to equal protection. Id. The article included an excerpt from the official
trial transcript of United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981), which the
Hernandez majority had cited as representing what can go wrong when a juror does
not accept the interpreter's official translation. High Court Cites Basis, supra, at Al,
col. 5. In heavily Latino South Florida, where racial and ethnic tensions already run
high, this message was viewed with alarm by some, see infra note 20, and with ap-
proval by others, e.g., The Language of Justice, MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 1991, at
A 18, col. I (Broward ed.) (staff editorial declaring "'Latino' Ruling is Right.").
1570 [Vol. 16
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quire an interpreter. A ruling which makes it easier to strike those pro-
spective jurors would greatly alter the composition of the resulting
20jury. 2
This comment examines the reasoning employed in deciding the
Hernandez issue. Section II summarizes the facts of the case and the
procedural history from the trial court to the New York Appellate Di-
vision, to the New York Court of Appeals. This section also discusses
the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of the New York
Court of Appeals. Section III focuses on the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, analyzing the majority, concurring and dis-
senting opinions, including those inquiries and policy considerations
which the court did not address. Section IV concludes that the Court
failed to recognize that the prosecutor's explanation was language-
based,2 but that this view was logically necessary to arrive at the
Court's ultimate decision-that the prosecutor's explanation did not
constitute a per se violation of the equal protection clause.22 Also, de-
spite the Court's initial error, its ultimate decision was justified for two
reasons. First, to have declared the explanation a per se violation would
have extended the concept of race to a level which would be overly
broad. Second, the decision does not bar a trial court from finding a
violation of the equal protection clause on the ground that a prosecu-
tor's explanation was pretextual. 21 Regarding the secondary issue of the
degree of deference to be accorded a trial court's finding, Part III con-
cludes that the Hernandez decision to accord great deference,24 even to
trial court findings made in the absence of any mandated guidelines,
was a failure to recognize the potential for abuse in exercising peremp-
tory challenges against bilingual Latinos.
20. See High Court Cites Basis, supra note 19, at Al, col. 4. "Miami defense
lawyer Fred Schwartz called the ruling 'a terrible deprivation of a defendant's civil
rights. I think that's terrible, particularly in our district, where half our population is
Hispanic, and most of our jury pools are one-third or one-half bilingual.'" Id. Further-
more, "Il]awyers for Hispanic groups said the ruling could lead to abuses. 'Prosecutors
could readily rely on the reason this prosecutor gave to exclude Latinos from many,
many juries around the country,' said Kenneth Kimerling, a lawyer for the Puerto Ri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York City." Id.
21. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1872-73.
24. Id. at 1869.
1992] 1571
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II. THE HISTORY OF HERNANDEZ V. NEw YORK
A. Facts of the Case
In December, 1985, on a Brooklyn street, the defendant, Dionisio
Hernandez, fired several shots at his girlfriend25 and her mother as
they left a restaurant.26 His girlfriend suffered two serious wounds, but
the shots missed the mother, hitting instead two men in a nearby res-
taurant. All the victims survived the shooting. The defendant was crim-
inally charged by the State of New York with two counts of attempted
murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the
second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree.27
During jury selection, defense counsel objected to the prosecution's
exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all four potential Latino
jurors.28 The defendant dropped his claim regarding two of the jurors
after it was explained that they were excluded because each of them
had a brother who had been convicted of a crime. Without waiting for
a ruling by the court on whether the defendant had established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination regarding the other two jurors, the
prosecutor volunteered his explanation. The prosecutor stated that
when the potential jurors were asked if they could disregard the Span-
ish language testimony of witnesses and accept only the interpreter's
official English translation, they looked away from the prosecutor and
hesitantly said that they would try to follow the interpreter.29 The pros-
ecutor continued that even though the jurors' final answers were that
they could accept the interpreter's official translation, he "just felt from
the hesitancy in their answers and their lack of eye contact that they
would not be able to do it."' 0 His concern was that if they could not
accept the official interpretation, they "would have an undue impact on
25. The woman was alternately referred to as defendant's fiancee, see Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 9, at 7, and "young woman friend," see New York v. Hernandez,
552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990).
26. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990); Hernandez v.
New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1864 (1991).
27. Hernandez, 11 S. Ct. at 1864; Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 2, 3;
see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 7.
28. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622; Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1864.
29. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622; Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864.
30. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865 n.1.
1572 [Vol. 16
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the jury." I He also explained that no motive existed for him to exclude
Latinos from the jury, since all of the parties-defendant, victims, and
witnesses-were Latino. After stating that it was just as likely that a
bilingual Latino juror would sympathize with the victim as with the
defendant, thereby negating a motive for excluding Latinos from the
jury, the trial judge denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial.32
The case was tried with no Latinos on the jury, and the defendant was
convicted on two counts of attempted murder and two counts of crimi-
nal possession of a weapon.33
B. Procedural History
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
ruled that the defendant had made out a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation under Batson, since the prosecutor had challenged the only pro-
spective jurors with Hispanic surnames.3" However, the court ruled
that the prosecutor had satisfied his burden of coming forward with a
race neutral explanation sufficient to rebut the inference of intentional
discrimination, and therefore unanimously affirmed the trial court's
judgment.35 The appellate division, although given factfinding power
under New York statutes, 36 appeared to have simply accepted the ex-
planation given by the prosecutor as being reasonable in light of the
record, noting that it was not necessary for the explanation to rise to
the level needed to justify a challenge for cause.37
In a four-to-two decision, the judgment of the lower courts was
31. Id. at 1865; Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 622.
32. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865 n.2.
33. Id. at 1864.
34. New York v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1988).
35. Id.
36. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 7-8, 41 n.20 (citing N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 470.15 (McKinney, 1983)).
37. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 626. A challenge for cause must be supported
by documentation which indicates that a juror holds a particular bias which may pre-
vent him or her from impartially deciding the case, see New York v. Hernandez, 552
N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990), or that the juror is unable to follow the court's instruc-
tions regarding the law and the evidence to be considered, see Brief for Respondent,
supra note 4, at 19. A peremptory challenge, on the other hand, does not require sup-
porting documentation, but can be exercised if the prosecutor merely suspects that the
juror may be biased or unable to follow the court's instructions. Hernandez, 552
N.E.2d at 622.
1992] 1573
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affirmed by New York's high court.3" The court of appeals held that
the prosecutor's explanation for challenging the jurors was facially race
neutral.3 9 The court of appeals then deferred to the lower courts' fac-
tual findings4" that the prosecutor's facially neutral explanation was not
pretextual"I and was therefore acceptable.42
C. Analysis of the New York Court of Appeals Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority reached its conclusion by applying the three-part test
set forth in Batson v. Kentucky"' to determine if the prosecutor had
used his peremptory challenges to discriminate against the defendant's
ethnic group.44 The first part of the test, requiring the defendant to
make a prima facie showing that peremptory challenges were used to
discriminate on the basis of race,4 5 was readily handled, since the pros-
ecution did not dispute that a prima facie case of discrimination had
been made out by the peremptory strikes of all Latino members of the
venire."I The second part provides that once a prima facie case of dis-
crimination has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to rebut the inference of discrimination by offering a race-neutral ex-
planation for excluding the jurors in question. 47 In the only previous
New York Court of Appeals opinion on point, New York v. Scott,48 the
court reversed without having to reach the issue of what constitutes a
neutral explanation under Batson, because the state had never offered
an explanation to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of purposeful
38. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990).
39. Id. at 623.
40. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 41 n.20 (explaining that the New
York Constitution and statutes grant jurisdiction to the court of appeals only over ques-
tions of law in most criminal cases, and allow the court to review facts only in death
penalty cases). This was not a death penalty case and, therefore, the court of appeals
was precluded from reviewing the facts as a matter of law. Id.
41. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 624.
42. Id.
43. 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
44. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 1990).
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
46. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (construed in New York v. Hernandez, 552
N.E.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. 1990)).
48. 516 N.E.2d 1208 (N.Y. 1987).
1574 [Vol. 16
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discrimination.49 Thus, this issue in Hernandez was a case of first im-
pression for the court. 50
Batson offers little guidance as to what constitutes a neutral expla-
nation, other than to state that:
[Tihe prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judge-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of their
shared race . . . Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's
case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'af-
firm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.'51
Based on this loosely-stated guideline, the conclusion sought by the
defendant-that the prosecutor's explanation was not neutral and,
therefore, constituted a per se violation-would necessarily require two
findings by the court. The court would first have to find that the chal-
lenge made by the prosecutor was, in fact, based on Spanish language
ability, and would also have to find that Spanish language ability and
Latino origin are so closely related that a challenge based on Spanish
language ability is tantamount to a challenge based on ethnic
49. Id. at 1211; see also Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 626. When Scott was
decided Batson had not yet been decided. Scott, 516 N.E.2d at 1209. The law gov-
erning peremptory challenges for discriminatory purposes at that time was Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain put the burden on the defendant to overcome
the presumption that the prosecutor was not peremptorily striking jurors in a discrimi-
natory manner. Scott, 516 N.E.2d at 1209-10. The defendant could carry this burden
only by establishing that the prosecutor had routinely excluded jurors on the basis of
race over a period of time. Id. at 1210. Since the defendant in Scott was not able to
establish a pattern of discrimination over several cases, but could only point to his own
case, the presumption carried that the prosecutor did not use his peremptory strikes to
discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 1211. Thus, the prosecutor never had to re-
spond to the defendant's objections. While Scott was on appeal, Batson was decided.
Id. at 1210. The new judge-made law, which required a showing of discrimination
solely in the defendant's case in order to make out a prima facie case, overruled
Swain's evidentiary burden, and was applied retroactively to Scott. Id. at 1211. It was
held that the defendant had indeed established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
Since the trial judge was no longer in the county and it was impossible to reconstruct a
record because of the length of time that had elapsed, the court of appeals simply
reversed Scott's conviction without the state ever coming forward with a statement to
rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 1211-12.
50. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626.
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
632 (1972)).
1992] 1575
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grounds.52 The majority did not deny the language-ethnic connection,
but did not accept the proposition that the challenge was made on the
basis on language ability.58 While the court acknowledged that "[tjhese
jurors . . . were challenged because they indicated their knowledge of
the Spanish language might interfere with their sworn responsibility as
jurors to accept the official translation of the Spanish-proffered testi-
mony," 5  the majority ultimately elected to decide the case on the basis
that "the essence of this case [is] really about a prosecutor's court-
accepted explanation concerning the ability of these jurors-or any
sworn jurors no matter their race or ethnic similarities-to decide a
case on the official evidence before them . . . ."51 Having made the
decision that the reasons were not grounded in Spanish language abil-
ity, the connection to ethnicity or race was moot, and the majority was
thus able to conclude that the reasons offered by the prosecutor consti-
tuted a race-neutral explanation under Batson.56 Therefore, a per se
violation of the equal protection clause did not exist.
If part two of the Batson test indicates that the state carried its
burden in coming forward with an explanation which was facially race-
neutral, then the evaluation must proceed to the third part of the test,
which involves a determination by the trial court whether or not the
defendant has carried the ultimate burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination . 7 Essentially in part three, the trial court chooses whether
or not to believe the facially race-neutral explanation given by the pros-
ecutor based on the court's determination as to whether the prosecu-
tor's explanation was a pretext, or was real and supported by the total-
ity of factors surrounding the voir dire.5 8 The majority gave great
deference to the factual finding by the trial court that the prosecutor's
explanation was not pretextual and was, therefore, acceptable as a le-
gitimate ground for peremptorily striking the two jurors.5 9 Relying on
both federal60 and state sources6' as authority for deferring to the find-
52. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
58. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623.
59. Id. at 623-24.
60. In Batson, the Court reiterated that
,a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to ap-
propriate deference by a reviewing court. Since the trial judge's findings in
1576 [Vol. 16
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ings of fact of the lower courts, the majority noted that the United
States Supreme Court adheres to the view that resolution of issues
hinging on credibility is best made by trial courts that are in the best
position to observe the parties and judge all the circumstances; appel-
late courts are best served by deferring to the credibility findings of
those courts.62 The court was careful to point out, however, that its
ruling should not be taken to mean that all facially race-neutral expla-
nations will be accepted.63 Those that are clearly pretextual will, as a
matter of law, be rejected as insufficient to overcome a defendant's
claim of purposeful discrimination.64
The majority, having applied the three-part Batson test, thus con-
cluded that the trial court did not err in its finding that the prosecutor's
peremptory strikes of two bilingual Latino jurors was not an equal pro-
tection violation.65
2. The Concurring Opinion: A Discussion of the Peremptory
Challenge System in Light of Batson
The question presented in Hernandez afforded Judge Titone the
opportunity to discuss his "strongly held beliefs" regarding peremptory
challenges in light of Batson.66 The subject of "post-Batson peremptory
challenges" '67 has been, and will continue to be, debated in an effort to
find a balance between the peremptory challenge system and the anti-
discrimination policy of the equal protection clause.68 A challenge is
the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of
credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great
deference.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573,
575-76 (1985)) (citations omitted).
61. See supra note 40, which explains why the majority stated: "[W]e have no
basis in law . . . to conclude that those courts erred in these essentially factual deter-
minations." Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 624.
62. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 623-24.
63. Id. at 624.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 625.
66. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J.,
concurring).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (commenting on the "pernicious nature of the racially discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Pro-
19921 1577
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either for cause, requiring an explanation, or is peremptory, requiring
no explanation. 9 Conceptually, it is difficult to comprehend how a pe-
remptory challenge can be "somewhat" explained. 70 It "either has to be
explained or it does not . . . . [T]o permit inquiry into the basis for a
peremptory challenge would force 'the peremptory challenge [to] col-
lapse into the challenge for cause.' "71 On the other hand, the solution
is not to return to a system which permits suspiciously discriminatory
peremptory challenges to go unexplained. 2
The concurring justice recommended that finding a balance be-
tween Batson and the peremptory challenge system is a task for the
courts or the legislatures. 73 Since efforts by the courts to find such a
balance will necessarily yield even more "layers of inquiry and complex
tests," Judge Titone calls for the legislatures to review and perhaps
tection Clause .... The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only
by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely."); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("Were it necessary to make an absolute choice
between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peretnptorily, the Con-
stitution compels a choice of the former."); see also Brian J. Serr and Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a
Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-18 (1988); Brent J. Gurney,
The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 227, 244 (1986). For very recent comments made in light of the deluge of
Batson cases, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he States and Congress may simply abolish peremptory
challenges, which would cause justice to suffer in a different fashion."), and Stewart,
supra note 4, at 38 ("Many have begun to question whether Batson sounded the death
knell for peremptory challenges in the American courts."). See also Marcia Coyle, Not
the Last Word on Juries (Not the Court's Final Judgment on Peremptories), NAT'L
L.J., June 17, 1991, at 1, col. 4, & 28, col. 4 (discussing the effect of the recent deci-
sions in Batson cases, and noting that "the high court's [sic) new law in this area also
affects the long-term viability of peremptory challenges themselves").
69. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.(quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
72. Id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting "[tihe inherent potential of pe-
remptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on
racial grounds .... ").
73. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 625 (Titone, J., concurring). But cf. Stewart,
supra note 4, at 42 (discussing the views of Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., of the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals that "[i]nevitably, whether it takes five years or 15
years, Batson has to bring down the peremptory challenge as we know it," and noting
that Justice Marshall had made that prediction in Batson).
1578 [Vol. 16
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revamp the existing peremptory system.74
3. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent focused on the third stage of the Batson inquiry-the
determination by the trial court of whether or not the prosecutor's ex-
planation should be accepted as sufficient to rebut the defendant's
claim of purposeful discrimination.78 Whereas the majority had de-
ferred to the lower courts' judgment, the dissent felt that in order to
protect the constitutional rights of defendants, the role of the court of
appeals should be to articulate the standard by which the trial court
makes its finding regarding purposeful discrimination, and then deter-
mine, as a matter of law, whether the state has satisfied that stan-
dard.71 To simply defer to the findings of the lower court without an
evaluation of whether those findings were made in the context of a
clearly defined standard reduces the role of the court of appeals to a
"'rubber stamping' " function. 7 Although the dissent made the lan-
guage-ethnic connection and went on to classify the prosecutor's chal-
lenge as language-based, 78 it failed to accept the defendant's argument
that since an ethnic-based challenge would have been a per se violation,
therefore the language-based challenge must also constitute a per se
violation of Batson.79 The dissent did conclude, however, that because
of the intimate link between Spanish language and Latino ethnicity,
the prosecutor's language-based challenge had a disparate impact on
Latinos, even though it appeared facially race-neutral. 80 This disparate
74. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626 (Titone, J., concurring).
75. New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 626 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id. Interestingly, a report issued subsequent to the New York Court of Ap-
peals' review of Hernandez strengthened the dissent's opinion of what the role of the
court of appeals ought to be. See N.Y. Courts 'Racist', NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1991, at 6,
col. 2 (quoting from the report issued by the New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities). The seventeen members of the New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities, appointed in 1988 by New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Sol Wach-
tier, found the state's court system to be "infested with racism" and granting "base-
ment justice" to minorities. Id. The recently issued report stated that there are "two
justice systems at work in the courts of New York State, one for whites, and a very
different one for minorities and the poor." Id.
78. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 627-28.
15791992]
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impact rendered the prosecutor's neutral explanation "inherently sus-
pect" and as such, the dissent would require that the trial court ex-
amine the explanation under a standard of enhanced scrutiny.81 Under
this standard, a reason which appears to be based on an intuitive feel-
ing, rather than on facts discovered during voir dire, should be rejected
by the court.82
The dissent, referring to the record as quoted in the majority opin-
ion,8 3 concluded that the prosecutor's explanation was based on his in-
tuitive feeling that the two jurors could not follow the court's instruc-
tion to accept only the interpreter's official English translation of
Spanish language testimony. 84 Since the record reflected that ulti-
mately both jurors did satisfy the court that they would accept the offi-
cial court translation, the dissent could discern no factual basis for the
prosecutor's stated reason.8
In addition, under the dissent's enhanced level of scrutiny, the trial
court would have found other inconsistencies in the prosecutor's expla-
nation. For example, the prosecutor's concern that the jurors decide the
case on the basis of the same evidence could have been addressed by an
instruction from the court that Spanish-speaking jurors are to accept
only the English interpretation, and are to discreetly bring any discrep-
ancies to the court's attention, but not to the attention of their fellow
jurors.86 Not only would this have been permissible, but it would have
more rationally furthered the prosecutor's concern, for the state's inter-
est would be better served by having all the jurors decide the case on
the basis of not only the same evidence, but on the basis of the same,
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The record reflects the following:
Assistant District Attorney: Your Honor, my reason for rejecting . ..
these two is I feel very uncertain that they would be able to listen and
follow the interpreter . . . . I didn't feel, when I asked them whether or
not they could accept the interpreter's translation of it, I didn't feel that
they could . ...
The Court: [Hie [Assistant District Attorney] said the reason that he did
in fact remove these jurors is because even though they said they could
listen to what the interpreter said and not let their own evaluation of what
the witness says be the answer that they would utilize, he said [he had]
grave doubts . . ..
Id. at 622 (some emphasis appears in the opinion, other emphasis added).
84. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 629.
1580 [Vol. 16
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non-erroneous evidence."7 The dissent noted that other state courts, in
construing their respective state constitutions, have held that a trial
court cannot simply accept at face value the explanation offered by the
prosecutor, but instead has a duty to examine certain types of evidence
when making its determination as to whether or not a prosecutor's
facially race-neutral explanation is pretextual or insufficient.88 Had the
87. Id. at 628-29.
88. Id. at 627. The dissent specifically cites Florida v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22
(Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988). Other state courts with set guidelines have
also reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala.
1987); California v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 760-62, 765 (Cal. 1978); New Jersey v.
Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1166 (N.J. 1986). In Florida v. Slappy, the Florida Supreme
Court decreed that
the presence of one or more of these factors [from the nonexclusive list of
five factors] will tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually sup-
ported by the record or are an impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group
bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine
the juror or perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial court nor
opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for
special questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecu-
tor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based
on reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22.
Had the trial court in Hernandez applied the Slappy test, two of the factors would
have indicated that the prosecutor's reasons were not supported by the record or were a
pretext. Factor number three has significance because it might be expected that if a
Latino is asked whether he or she can disregard what is heard in Spanish and accept
only the English interpretation, the response will be a slight hesitation. Hernandez v.
New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991). In addition, factor number five is applicable
because the record does not show whether the prosecutor questioned non-Latino mem-
bers of the venire regarding their Spanish language ability. New York v. Hernandez,
552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. 1990). It is entirely possible that one or more of those
individuals was indeed bilingual and therefore no less likely than the excluded jurors to
have difficulty in following the court's instruction to disregard the Spanish language
testimony. Similarly, in California v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held that
the prosecutor's explanation for excluding a juror would be acceptable only if he could
"satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptories ... for reasons of specific bias
. .. " California v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978). The trial court in Her-
nandez viewed the lack of specific bias as favorable to the state's position, reasoning
that if the defendant, the victim and the witness were each Latino, then the jurors were
just as likely to sympathize with the victims as with the defendant, and hence the
prosecutor had no motive to exclude the jurors. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1865 & n.2.
But the same set of facts, if analyzed under Wheeler, would have been viewed as unfa-
vorable to the state's position, since the prosecutor would have no justification for pe-
remptorily challenging a juror who has no specific bias. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
15
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dissent prevailed in this case, New York would be added to the list of
states which set specific guidelines for trial courts to follow when mak-
ing findings of fact relating to a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges. 89 When such guidelines are established, appellate courts have a
basis upon which to rule, as a matter of law, whether or not the trial
courts clearly erred in making their findings of fact.90
Although the dissent did not discuss whether the appellate division
erred by failing to apply the proper review power-legal sufficiency and
weight of the evidence 9'-this area of inquiry would have provided yet
another basis for the dissent to conclude that the court of appeals
should have reversed the holding of the appellate division as a matter
of law. 92 Since the appellate division's opinion in Hernandez manifested
only an application of the legal sufficiency standard of review, 93 the
New York Court of Appeals would have been justified in reversing and
remitting the case to the appellate division for reconsideration of the
case, including a weight of the evidence review. 4
9, at 24-25; see also Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765; Gilmore, 511 A.2d at 1166.
89. Florida, Alabama, California and New Jersey are among those states which
have set guidelines. See supra note 88.
90. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 626 (Kaye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he citizens of this
State [sic] would be well served by the development of an authoritative body of State
[sic] law instead of being held in suspense, case-by-case, over the next decade of litiga-
tion . ... ").
91. See People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 673 (N.Y. 1987); infra note 92.
92. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 673 (court held it reversible error when appellate
division "avoids its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence in
criminal cases"). Under New York law, defendants are entitled to two standards of
intermediate appellate review: legal sufficiency, which requires only a determination of
whether it was reasonable, based on the record, for the trier of fact to have reached the
conclusion at issue, id. at 674-75, and weight of the evidence, which requires that
where, based on the record, a different finding would not have been unreasonable, the
appellate division must weigh the evidence by performing a factual analysis and must
make a determination whether the trier of fact accorded the proper weight to the evi-
dence. Id. at 675. However, the appellate division must give great weight to the trial
court's findings of fact when those findings turned on credibility. Id.
93. People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1988).
94. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 675. Had the appellate division been required to
apply a weight of the evidence review, a different finding-that the prosecutor's expla-
nation was insufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of intentional discrimi-
nation-might have been reached.
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IlI. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
In its brief to the Supreme Court of the United States, defense
counsel contended that the real issue in Hernandez is whether bilingual
Latinos can ever be jurors in criminal cases in which there may be
testimony in Spanish.95 But the argument can be extended to whether
bilinguals of any ethnic group can ever be jurors in criminal cases in
which there may be testimony in the non-English language of that
group."6 It is logical to conclude that the greater the ethnic population
of a given community, the greater the number of persons in that com-
munity for whom English is not the language generally spoken. There-
fore, the greater the ethnic population of a given community, the
greater the probability that a trial involving a member of that popula-
tion will require the use of an interpreter. 97
Defense counsel argued that if prosecutors are allowed to peremp-
95. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10.
96. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1872 (1991).
97. As of 1975, 42% of all Latinos claimed Spanish as the language they usually
speak. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10 n.2 (citing Leobardo F. Estrada, The
Extent of Spanish/English Bilingualism in the United States, 15 AZTLAN, INT'L J.
CHICANO STUD. REs. at 381 (1984)); see also Brief for the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of
Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, app. D at 5, Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (No. 89-
7645) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae](citing Estrada, supra, as its source). De-
fense counsel construed this data to mean that, in cases involving Latinos, there is a
42% probability (nationwide) that an interpreter will be used. Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 9, at 10 n.2.
This is not necessarily a logical conclusion. For example, statewide in Florida,
Spanish is the first language of 83 % of all Latinos and the language of over 93 % of all
Cubans. See Brief for Amici Curiae, supra app. C at 4 (source: U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1980, 1983)). This, however, does not necessarily mean that these individuals
do not also speak their second language, English, well enough to testify at trial without
an interpreter. For example, only 16% of all Latinos living in Florida (and 20% of all
Cubans) reported they did not speak or understand English, while 18% of all Latinos
(20% of' all Cubans) described their ability to speak or understand English as "not
well." Brief for Amici Curiae, supra app. A at 2 (source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1980, 1983)). Thus, it is not 83% of Latinos and 93% of Cubans that would require
an interpreter, but only 34% of Latinos and 40% of Cubans living in Florida that
would require an interpreter if they were to give testimony. A full 66% of all Latinos,
and 60% of all Cubans, would not require an interpreter. But the 83% and 93%
figures do impact on juror status, since it is logical to conclude that many, who claim
Spanish as their first language, are also part of the 66% and 60% who do not require
an interpreter, and are therefore bilingual and at risk of exclusion from the jury.
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torily challenge bilingual members of an ethnic group because of their
ability to understand the testimony expected to be given in the lan-
guage of their ethnic group, then very few juries will include bilingual
ethnic jurors. 98 The impact on communities with large ethnic, bilingual
populations with resulting jury pools that are significantly bilingual
would be to exclude a large portion of the community from the jury,
based on a prosecutor's concern that those jurors might not be able to
disregard what they hear firsthand from the testimony.9" It was defense
counsel's strategy to integrally link the ability to speak a foreign lan-
guage, Spanish, with ethnic background, Latino, so that to challenge
for the former would be the equivalent of a challenge for the latter, and
thus a per se violation of the equal protection clause, as interpreted in
Batson.1"' For the defendant to prevail on this "per se" basis, it was
98. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10-11.
99. Id.
100. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1866. In its reply brief, defense counsel conceded
that there is one situation in which it would be proper and race-neutral to peremptorily
challenge bilingual jurors on the basis of their Spanish language ability: when the sub-
stantive issue of the trial concerns conflicting translations of out-of-court statements
and the jury's determination must turn on testimony from expert witnesses in the field
of Spanish language. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15-16, Hernandez v. New York,
Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (No. 89-7645)[hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Brief]. In such a
case, a juror's expertise in the Spanish language might cause him or her to have an
undue influence on the jury in persuading its members as to the "correct translation" of
the disputed statement. Id. But where there is no issue in which Spanish language
expertise plays a role, in other words, where knowledge of Spanish language and all its
nuances and dialects is not the substantive issue in the case, then a bilingual juror
would not have an undue influence on the jury. Id.
The state's argument, conceded by the defense as applicable only in the previously
mentioned situation, was that just as a doctor might be peremptorily struck from serv-
ing as a juror on a medical malpractice case, or a psychiatrist might be peremptorily
struck from serving as a juror on a criminal case involving an insanity defense, so
might a bilingual juror be struck from serving as a juror on a case involving Spanish
language interpretation, because in all cases the juror's special expertise would enable
him or her to unduly influence the jury. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 18. In
support of its argument, the state cited New Jersey v. Pemberthy, 540 A.2d 227 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 546 A.2d 547 (1988). In Pemberthy, which involved
the disputed translation of out-of-court audio-taped conversations in Spanish, all jurors
who spoke Spanish were peremptorily challenged. Id. at 232. The court found that
because the substantive issue involved Spanish language translation, the state's expla-
nation, which on its face intended to discriminate based on Spanish language, was
race-neutral. Id. at 233-34. In contrast, defense counsel distinguished Hernandez from
Pemberthy by noting that Hernandez contained no issue which required Spanish lan-
guage expertise. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra at 16.
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critical for the Court to conclude that the prosecutor intentionally dis-
criminated on the basis of language, a conclusion the majority did not
reach.""l Having failed to reach that threshold conclusion, it did not
then matter whether or not the Court accepted the second premise that
language and ethnicity were one and the same, although there were
indications during oral arguments that the Court would not have made
that connection.1"2 At this point, the defendant's legal argument in sup-
port of a per se Batson violation was doomed, for if the prosecutor's
challenge was not made on the basis of language, it did not matter
whether language and ethnicity were one and the same, and therefore,
the prosecutor's statement, at least on its face, was neutral.
A. The Majority Opinion
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the jurors had
been excluded not because of uniquely individual responses, but be-
cause of responses characteristic of all bilingual Latinos, in other
words, because of a Latino trait-Spanish language ability.1"3 Defense
counsel reasoned that the jurors had been asked if they could block out
and disregard what they would hear in Spanish and accept only the
official English from the interpreter. 04 Because of the difficulty, if not
the impossibility, of performing such a task'05 all bilingual Latinos
101. Hernandez, I11 S. Ct. at 1867. See infra Part 11, Section B, "The Majority
Opinion," for the majority's rationale in reaching its conclusion.
102. During oral argument before the Court, Justice Souter questioned whether
the correlation between bilingualism and national origin was as strong as had been
suggested. See Arguments Before the Court, 59 U.S.L.W. 3591, 3592 (U.S. Mar. 5,
1991) (Supreme Court Proceedings).
103. Hernandez v. New York, 11l S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991).
104. Id.
105. Two major reasons exist for the difficulty. The first relates to a phenomenon
known as code-switching, which is the alternating use of two languages by Hispanic
bilinguals. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 100, at 11. Often the switch from one
language to another is not made consciously. Id. at 12. Recent studies show "that when
asked to recall the language in which certain information was received, bilinguals have
no memory of the input language. They appear to have retained only the information
itself. They have not tagged this information in memory according to the language in
which it was obtained." Id. (citing Magiste, The Competing Language Systems of the
Multilingual: A Developmental Study of Decoding and Encoding Processes, 18 J.
VERBAL LEARNING BEHAVIOR, 79, 79-89 (1979)). "There is no evidence that bilingual
individuals of any type have the ability to switch off one of their language systems." Id.
at 13 (citing M. ALBERT & L. OBLER. THE BILINGUAL BRAIN (1975); Grosjean, The
Bilingual as a Competent but Specific Speaker-Hearer, 6 J. MULTILINGUAL MUL-
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would reflexively hesitate when asked what these jurors had been
asked, even though they were willing to comply.106 Thus, defense coun-
sel contended that the prosecutor's doubts about the jurors' ability to
comply with the court's instructions would have applied to the entire
class of bilingual Latinos as a function of its Spanish language ability,
since the hesitancy which prompted the prosecutor's doubts was a re-
flex which all bilingual Latinos would have exhibited.1"7 This conten-
tion is logical only if one accepts the premise that the prosecutor's
question will always be phrased to place bilingual jurors in the impossi-
ble position of having to respond that they can block out and disregard
what they will hear in Spanish. It is true that if the prosecutor phrases
the question in a "yes or no" manner, most bilingual Latinos would
reflexively hesitate before answering that they could, in fact, comply
with the court's instruction to disregard the Spanish language testi-
mony, while some would hesitate before answering that they could not
comply (and would therefore be excused for cause). But there might be
some, who would immediately, and without hesitation, respond that
they could comply with the court's instruction. Further, one does not
have to accept defense counsel's premise that the prosecutor will pose
the question in a manner which is designed to evoke a hesitant re-
sponse. It is entirely possible that the prosecutor could ask a prospec-
tive juror if he or she will listen to the interpreter and accept the offi-
cial translation, and further ask that should a discrepancy in the
translation be noted, if he or she will discreetly bring it to the court's
attention so as not to make the other jurors aware of the problem until
it can be resolved by the court. If the question were phrased in this
way, then very few, if any, bilingual Latinos would hesitate before an-
swering that, "yes," they could comply. Thus, the responses of the ju-
rors are a function of the way that the question is phrased. Even if
TICULTURAL DEV., 467, 467-77 (1985)).
The second reason relates to the difficulty all jurors face when asked to follow
instructions which require them to disregard evidence they have already heard. See,
e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1968) (quoting excerpts from
Judge Learned Hand's opinions: "[Instructing the jury to disregard evidence is a] rec-
ommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); "[l]t is
indeed very hard to believe that a jury will, or for that matter can, in practice observe
the admonition." United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (subse-
quent history omitted)).
106. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1867.
107. Id. at 1868.
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phrased in the manner most likely to evoke a hesitant response, there
might still be some who will not hesitate. Therefore, it is conclusory to
state that all bilinguals would react to the prosecutor's question in the
same way. Based on defense counsel's contention, however, the defend-
ant sought to have the Court conclude that the prosecutor's explanation
for challenging the jurors was not a legitimate, neutral explanation
based on difficulty in following the court's instructions, but was instead
an explanation which clearly was language/ethnicity based.'08 By elect-
ing to accept the state's argument that the prosecutor's reason was
based on considerations regarding ability to follow the court's instruc-
tions, the Court did not have to reach the question of whether language
ability and Latino ethnicity were to be considered as interchangeable
for purposes of equal protection, analysis.109 As Justice Kennedy
explained,
A neutral explanation . . . here means an explanation based on
something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the in-
quiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation.
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's expla-
nation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." 0
Having found nothing in the prosecutor's statement that indicated an
intent to discriminate on the basis of language ability or Latino ethnic-
ity, the majority concluded that, under step two of the Batson analysis,
the reason offered was race neutral."' Thus the majority found no per
se violation of the equal protection clause." 2
For the Court to have declared the prosecutor's statement a per se
violation, it would necessarily have had to expand the concept of race
to include language ability, so that every challenge based on language
would be an "automatic" per se equal protection violation. Such a step
would have expanded the concept of race too broadly for any sort of
equal protection analysis. The Court did not declare the challenge to be
a per se violation because the Court's initial premise, upon which its
conclusion was based, was incorrect. The Court failed to recognize that
the prosecutor's speculation regarding the bilingual jurors' inability to
accept only the official interpretation of Spanish language testimony
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1866-67.
110. Id. at 1866.
Ill. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1866-67.
112. Id. at 1867.
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was, in reality, a language-based reason. The Court did not acknowl-
edge that the prosecutor simply felt uncomfortable with the jurors'
Spanish language ability, despite their stated willingness to comply
with the court's instructions. Having committed to this incorrect pre-
mise, the Court then had no choice but to conclude that if the explana-
tion was not based on language, it could not be a per se violation.113
Had the Court recognized that, in this case, the challenge was lan-
guage based, and logically gone on to hold that the challenge was a per
se violation, the concept of race would have been expanded too broadly
for any future equal protection analysis to be meaningful. It would
have meant, for example, that if a prosecutor peremptorily challenged
a bilingual non-Latino on the basis of his or her language skills, the
court would deem the challenge to be language, and hence, race-based,
and would declare the challenge a per se equal protection violation,
even though the juror may not have been a member of any "cognizable
racial group"'1 4 ordinarily thought to require protection under the
equal protection clause. Foreseeing this possibility, perhaps the Court
intentionally did not reach the first premise-that the prosecutor's ex-
planation was language-based-in order to avoid reaching the conclu-
sion that the explanation was a per se violation of the equal protection
clause. Although language and ethnicity are closely intertwined, it
would be overinclusive to declare every language-based challenge to be
a race-based challenge. With many school districts mandating Spanish
language instruction for English-speaking students, it is not uncommon
to find bilingual individuals who are not members of an ethnic minority
group. Therefore, the Court's ruling was a prudent one.
The Court's decision not to declare the challenge a per se violation
is not harsh because it leaves open the possibility that, in part three of
the Batson analysis, the challenge could still be found unconstitutional
on grounds of pretext or insufficiency, in light of "the particular cir-
cumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors
Under Batson, the analysis must continue to part three even if
113. For the Court to declare the explanation a per se violation, it would have
had to conclude first, that the explanation was language-based, and second, that lan-
guage was a proxy for race/ethnicity. Having failed to reach the first conclusion, it was
logically impossible to reach the ultimate conclusion that the explanation was a per se
violation.
114. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
115. Hernandez, I1l S. Ct. at 1873.
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part two yields a finding that no per se violation had occurred."' 0 How-
ever, unlike part two, where the only consideration is the facial validity
of the prosecutor's explanation, in part three of the Batson analysis, all
factors concerning the voir dire and the proceedings are to be consid-
ered by the trial court when determining if the explanation, though
facially neutral, is really a pretext for purposeful discrimination.1 ' For
example, the disparate impact of the prosecutor's criterion on Latinos,
though not proof of discriminatory intent, may be used by the court as
evidence of such intent.118 Similarly, the trial court could consider as
evidence of discriminatory intent the fact that the prosecutor chose to
exclude all bilingual jurors even after a method far less drastic was
suggested to him." 9 It was the opinion of the majority that since the
trial court had ample opportunity to explore these and other possibili-
ties, and since the trial court was in the best position to observe the
parties and make findings regarding their credibility,12 0 then on appeal,
great deference should be accorded to the trial judge's finding of fact
that the prosecutor's explanation was non-pretextual and to be be-
lieved. 21 Furthermore, the majority flatly rejected defense counsel's
contention that, because a Batson claim involves a racial/ethnic classi-
fication, review of a trial court's decision in such a case should receive
independent appellate review.1"2 The Court rested its decision on prece-
dent holding that, unless "exceptional circumstances" existed, the
Court would defer to factual findings of state courts, and even if those
findings related to a constitutional issue it would not alter the Court's
position based on deference. 23 Thus, a reversal of the trial court's find-
ing of fact on the issue of discriminatory intent would be possible only
if the Supreme Court was "convinced that the trial court's determina-
tion was clearly erroneous."124
116. Id. at 1868.
117. Id.
118. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
119. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868. Interestingly, the majority noted that intent
to discriminate would only be imputed to the prosecutor if defense counsel had first
suggested the less burdensome means. Id. Thus, the burden was on the defendant to
make such a suggestion.
120. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985).
121. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1871.
122. Id. In support of its position, the Court reiterated the explanation it had
given in Batson. See supra note 60.
123. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868-69.
124. Id. at 1871. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evi-
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"[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."' 25 Here,
there was sufficient evidence-the fact that the prosecutor had no mo-
tive to discriminate, since the victims, the defendant and the prosecu-
tion witnesses were all Latino' 2 6-6for the trial judge to have believed
the prosecutor's explanation.1" Thus the judge's view, albeit not the
only view that could have been taken, was permissible. Being a permis-
sible view of the evidence, the majority found no clear error in the trial
court's determination that the prosecutor did not intentionally discrimi-
nate on the basis of the jurors' ethnicity.128
In considering the degree of deference to be accorded a trial
court's judgment on appeal, the majority seemed at a loss to under-
stand the "nature of the review petitioner would have us conduct. 129
Defendant had stated that plenary federal review is required whenever
"critical constitutional values are at stake that extend beyond the rights
of the immediate parties involved .. "..,o In essence, because the
constitutional rights of all bilingual Latinos were at stake, defense
counsel sought some type of heightened scrutiny from the Court.'
The use of the term "scrutiny" was unfortunate,3 2 for if height-
ened (strict) scrutiny was sought, it was not applicable in this case.
Normally, when a state actor, such as the prosecutor, makes a classifi-
cation based on race or ethnicity, an equal protection analysis employ-
ing strict scrutiny will be performed. 13 Under such an analysis, the
classification will be permitted only if the state demonstrates a compel-
ling interest and if the scheme is narrowly tailored and necessary to
achieve that compelling state interest." But under Batson, this type of
equal protection analysis is impossible because the peremptory strike
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365 (1948).
125. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
126. Hernandez, III S. Ct. at 1872, 1865 n.2.
127. Id. at 1872.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1870.
130. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 34.
131. Id. at 41-42.
132. See infra note 144.
133. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
134. See id. at 274; Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985).
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based on race or ethnicity is never allowed to stand, even if the state's
interest is extremely compelling. 35 It cannot be conceded on the one
hand that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude a ju-
ror based on race or ethnicity, and then be claimed on the other that
the peremptory strike withstands strict scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause because the state had a compelling interest and the means
chosen--excluding the juror-were narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal. 1 36
Additionally, strict scrutiny was not applicable because the prereq-
uisite to this level of scrutiny is the establishment of invidious, inten-
tional discrimination, in other words, the establishment that the classi-
fication was made with the intent to discriminate based on race.3 7 But
in Batson type cases, this prerequisite cannot be satisfied prior to the
inquiry because the establishment of intentional discrimination is pre-
cisely the issue to be decided at the third level of inquiry."8' Further-
more, under Batson, in order to progress to the third level of in-
quiry-whether the stated reason for the peremptory challenge was a
pretext for intentional discrimination-it must have already been es-
tablished at the second level that, at least facially, the defendant's
prima facie case of invidious discrimination had been rebutted. 139 Thus,
the most that could exist at the third stage of inquiry was a "suspicion"
of intentional discrimination. A mere suspicion of intentional discrimi-
nation is insufficient to satisfy the prerequisite establishment of inten-
tional discrimination which is necessary to mandate an inquiry on ap-
peal under strict scrutiny.' 40
135. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-99.
136. Id.
137. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
138. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
139. Id. at 97. The inquiry would never proceed to the third level if a per se
violation of the equal protection clause had been found at the second level.
140. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242. The term "scrutiny," as used in constitutional
law, is often associated with an equal protection means-ends analysis. If state action is
analyzed tinder strict [a form of heightened] scrutiny, the action will be held violative
of the equal protection clause, and therefore unconstitutional, unless the means chosen
by the state are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest or objective.
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
It appears that despite the use of the phrase "heightened [strict] scrutiny" in Peti-
tioner's Brief, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 42, defense counsel was not refer-
ring to a means-ends analysis, i.e., level of scrutiny, at all, but was referring to the level
of factual analysis that he thought should be employed by the appellate courts. Id. at
42-46. In order to determine if the trial court's finding of no intentional discrimination
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However, if what the defendant sought was independent, de novo
factual review, that type of review is not only reasonable when constitu-
tional issues are involved, but is also reconcilable with the majority's
view regarding deference to the trial court's factual findings that turn
on credibility.' If the appellate court determined, after weighing the
facts and taking into consideration the deference to be accorded the
was clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of how that finding was made can
range from a de novo factual analysis all the way to extreme deference. Id. at 29.
When performing a de novo factual analysis to review for clear error, the appellate
court will analyze the method by which the trial court arrived at its decision and ascer-
tain that the facts in the record are sufficient to support that finding. Id. at 32. But if,
after weighing the evidence, the appellate court disagrees with the finding of the trial
court, it will overturn the trial court's finding, Id. Under a less stringent level of factual
analysis, if the appellate court is satisfied with the method used and the sufficiency of
the record, then even if it disagrees with the trial court's factual finding, it will con-
clude that the trial court reasonably could have found as it did and, therefore, that the
finding was not clearly erroneous. See People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 674-75
(N.Y. 1987). However, at the other extreme, the appellate court will not make any
inquiry into the method used by the trial court, but will instead simply defer to the trial
court's finding, provided there is some shred of support in the record. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 9, at 36.
In the present case, defense counsel sought to have the lower court's finding of
non-discrimination reviewed under a stringent, de novo factual analysis, whereby the
trial court's finding of non-discrimination would be held clearly erroneous unless firmly
supported by the record both as to weight and sufficiency. Id. at 36-39. In fact, though,
the trial record was incomplete, containing neither a voir dire record nor specific fac-
tual findings, see id. at 47, and thus, could not have supported the trial court's finding
under a de novo review for clear error. Therefore, the appellate court would have had
to discern clear error.
141. In satisfying both the defendant's request for de novo factual review and the
majority's insistence on deference to the trial court, the appellate court would first
examine the record to ascertain that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court's finding. This would be accomplished if a determination was made that it was
reasonable, based on the record, for the trial court judge to have made the finding at
issue. See Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 674-75. But then the appellate court would be re-
quired to go one step further in performing a weight of the evidence review. See supra
note 92.
In performing this appellate review, the court would determine if a different factual
finding would not have been unreasonable, and then, by a de novo factual analysis,
would weigh the facts to determine whether the trial court judge had correctly weighed
the facts. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d at 675. However, in weighing the facts, the appellate
court must assign great weight to the trial court's findings if those findings turned on
credibility. Id.
Thus, deference would be accorded those findings, but not to the exclusion of de novo
factual review.
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trial court, that the finding could not be supported by the weight of the
evidence-even after giving great weight to the trial court-then the
appellate court must conclude that the trial court's finding was clearly
erroneous. Thus, the defendant's request for independent plenary re-
view is entirely consistent with deference to a trial court's findings of
fact.
Of course, had the Court formulated specific guidelines by which
trial courts are to make findings of intentional discrimination in Batson
type cases, then the appellate review might be limited to a determina-
tion, as a matter of law, whether the trial court had reached its finding
by applying those guidelines.
B. The Concurring Opinion
The concurring justices viewed the defendant's case as an argu-
ment for establishing intentional discrimination on the basis of dispa-
rate impact,142 clearly an argument which the Court has never ac-
cepted. 4 In the view of the concurrence, all that Batson requires to
dispel the defendant's prima facie case of purposeful discrimination is
an explanation other than race."' Since the prosecutor's explanation
did not make any mention of race, it succeeded in rebutting any infer-
ence of purposeful discrimination, and thus the peremptory strike was
not a violation of the equal protection clause. ' "
In reaching this conclusion, the concurring justices interpreted
Batson in a purist light. According to the concurrence, the peremptory
strikes "may have acted like strikes based on race, but they were not
based on race. No matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to
race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race. "16
Under this reasoning, a prosecutor can avoid a per se equal protection
violation if he or she is careful to word the explanation in a manner
which does not mention race. 1 7 An analysis of the purist approach
142. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1873 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
143. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); see also Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
144. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1874.
146. Id.
147. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
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leads one to conclude that it is overly simplistic and invites deception
by encouraging prosecutors to play the game so that the "race words"
are never mentioned. "[A]ny prosecutor's office could develop a list of
10 or 15 standard reasons for striking a juror; the juror was 'inatten-
tive' or dressed poorly and thus 'did not seem to respect the system of
justice.' "148 Surely, when Batson was decided the majority could not
have intended that the requirement of a facially race-neutral explana-
tion to rebut a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination be fulfilled
by the meaningless recitation of empty words.
The concurrence did state, however, that the trial court retained
the right to disbelieve the prosecutor if the court considered dispropor-
tionate effect as evidence of intentional discrimination." 9 But if the
trial court chooses to believe the explanation, "and that finding is not
clearly erroneous, that is the end of the matter."150 Thus, even though
the trial court's findings of fact might have been arbitrary, made with-
out benefit of any clear set of guidelines, the concurrence, like the ma-
jority, would have those findings of fact reviewed on appeal for clear
error under a standard of extreme deference."'
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justice Mar-
shall joined, and Justice Blackmun joined in part. The thrust of their
opinion centered on the insufficiency of the prosecutor's explanation to
rebut the prima facie case of invidious discrimination.1 52 In the dis-
sent's view, the prima facie case made by the defendant could not have
been established without a preliminary showing of invidious, purposeful
intent to discriminate.153 Once this is shown, the burden then shifts to
the prosecutor to offer an explanation sufficient to rebut that prima
facie case, and does not mean that any facially neutral explanation
("Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.").
148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting David 0. Stewart, Court
Rules Against Jury Selection Based on Race, A.B.A. J., July 1986, at 68, 70.
149. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1874-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1875.
151. Id.
152. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1875-77 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
153. Id. at 1875-76; see supra note 49.
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which is not pretextual is sufficient."" It is entirely possible that an
explanation which is facially race-neutral and not pretextual could sim-
ply be insufficient to dispel the defendant's prima facie case of invidi-
ous discrimination. 55 In that event, the defendant would have carried
his burden of proving that the state peremptorily challenged a juror in
a manner which violated the equal protection clause.1 56 The dissent
felt, therefore, that the majority had erred "in focusing the entire in-
quiry on the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor" rather than on
objective evidence,' 57 since discriminatory purpose may exist even if a
prosecutor believes his motive to be pure.158
In this case, the justification given by the prosecutor, though
facially race-neutral, would nonetheless result in the disproportionate
exclusion of bilingual Latinos from the jury.159 Since such disparate
impact is evidence of discriminatory purpose,' 60 it was the opinion of
the dissent that an explanation which leads to evidence of discrimina-
tory purpose would be insufficient to rebut the prima facie case.' 6 ' The
dissent would reject the prosecutor's explanation, calling it "a proxy for
a discriminatory practice."' 62
The prosecutor's explanation could also be rejected based on pre-
cedent indicating that the state cannot use discriminatory means to ac-
commodate its concern when a nondiscriminatory alternative exists.' 63
154. Id. at 1876.
155. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 159-164, 188-190.
156. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. It is important to note that the defendant and his counsel did not accuse the
prosecutor of being racially motivated or intending to exclude Latinos because of their
national origin. Their only contention was that he intended to exclude bilinguals. The
prosecutor believed his motive to be pure, race-neutral and based on the case at bar.
Defense counsel never doubted the prosecutor's good faith, but merely made the point
that an intent to discriminate on the basis of language, even though seemingly neutral,
is tantamount to an intent to discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 9, at 20-22.
159. Hernandez, I1l S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
161. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1877.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) ("In deter-
mining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors,
including the ...efficacy of alternative remedies ....") (construed in Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989), to stand for the proposition that the state
cannot make distinctions on the basis of race if there are nondiscriminatory alternatives
which are just as effective).
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In the present case, if the prosecutor was concerned that the bilingual
jurors might hear different evidence than the other jurors and might
then have an undue influence upon the other jurors, the problem might
easily have been resolved by an instruction to the jury that the official
translation, and not the firsthand testimony, shall be evidence. 16  It is
interesting that in support of this proposition, the dissent cited United
States v. Perez,'65 the same case cited by the majority as an "[illustra-
tion of] the sort of problems that may arise where a juror fails to ac-
cept the official translation of foreign-language testimony."'06 In Perez,
the juror interrupted the proceedings to dispute the interpreter's trans-
lation of a word.' 67 The judge advised the juror it was improper for her
to question the interpreter directly in the presence of the other jurors,
declaring that if she had a question she must phrase it privately to the
judge. When the juror persisted, the interpreter responded by defend-
ing her qualifications as an interpreter. To this, the juror responded,
"it's an idiom, '"108 which was incorrectly recorded by the court reporter
as "you're an idiot. '169 It was only after this public interchange that
the judge instructed the jurors, apparently for the first time, that they
were to rely only upon the official English translation, and that should
they have questions they were to bring those questions discreetly to the
attention of the judge. 7 ' The judge then had the interpreter question
the witness as to the juror's doubts, and it was established that the
interpreter's translation had, after all, been what the witness intended,
and not what the juror claimed.' 7 ' But based on the juror's behavior,
the judge concluded the juror was angry and opinionated, and the
The majority opinion indicated that had the defendant suggested such an alterna-
tive to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor then refused the alternative, the trial court
could have considered the refusal to be evidence of intent to discriminate. Hernandez,
111 S. Ct. at 1868. The dissent, however, makes no such requirement that the prosecu-
tor first be apprised by the defendant of such an alternative. Id. at 1876 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The fact that the alternative exists and is one of which the prosecutor
should be aware, without the urging of the defendant, is sufficient. Id.
164. Hernandez, 11l S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
166. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1867 n.3. Excerpts from Perez appeared on the
front page of The Miami Herald on May 29, 1991, to emphasize the basis for the
Court's ruling in Hernandez. See supra note 19.
167. Perez, 658 F.2d at 662.
168. Id. at 663.
169. Id. at 662, 663.
170. Id. at 662-63.
171. Id. at 663.
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judge feared that the juror's attitude might infect the jury.1 72 As a re-
sult, the judge dismissed her from the jury.173
By citing Perez as support for their proposal, the dissent in Her-
nandez apparently did not view Perez as standing for the proposition
which the majority had suggested.17 ' The problem in Perez was not the
juror's failure or inability to accept the translation, but rather the fail-
ure of the court to instruct the jury before the Spanish language testi-
mony had begun. 175 As the dissent suggests, proper instructions given
to the jury prior to the commencement of any Spanish language testi-
mony would avoid any problem relating to how a juror should resolve a
translation discrepancy, and the level of confidentiality he or she must
maintain with respect to the other jurors. 17 1
Not only would this procedure be a non-discriminatory alternative
to the practice of excluding all bilingual Latinos, but logic dictates that
it would also further the state's interest in promoting fair trials.1 1 7 As
the dissenting opinion in the New York Court of Appeals noted,
"[s]urely, the majority does not intend to suggest . . . that if the trans-
lator is rendering a witness' testimony inaccurately into English, the
State has a valid interest in permitting the errors to go unnoticed. 17 8
To the, contrary, the state's interest should be to ensure that jurors do
not make decisions based on erroneous evidence, a proposition exempli-
fied in Santana v. New York City Transit Authority.79 Santana illus-
trates that justice is best served when bilinguals are seated as jurors in
cases involving Spanish language testimony and are permitted to dis-
creetly question the interpreter through the judge. 8 ' In this case, a
juror who spoke Spanish believed that the plaintiff's testimony had not
172. Perez, 658 F.2d at 663.
173. Id. During the pre-dismissal meeting, the juror admitted to the judge that
she had always had a problem "keeping [her] mouth shut." Id.
174. Cf. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Perez as
a good example of non-discriminatory means which the prosecutor could have taken)
with Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867 n.3 (citing Perez as an illustration of the harm
that can result when a bilingual juror has a problem with the official interpretation.)
175. Perez, 658 F.2d at 662-63. In addition, the difficulties that arose were at-
tributable to the individual juror's self-admitted emotional problem. Id. at 663.
176. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See New York v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628-29 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye,
J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179). 505 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
180. Id. at 777-78.
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been correctly translated by the interpreter.'81 He passed a note to the
court officer requesting permission to confer with the judge during a
recess. The judge first determined that since no other jurors had been
apprised of the matter, the juror would not have an undue influence on
the jury.' 82 The court then instructed counsel to re-call the witness to
the. stand, and upon further questioning, it was established that the ju-
ror, and not the interpreter, had been correct. 183 Thus, the jurors had
the benefit of deliberating and making their determination on the basis
of correct evidence.184
Ideally, such a discrepancy between jurors and interpreters should
not exist, for "[iJf the interpreters employed by our criminal courts are
as accurate as they should be, given that the defendant's liberty may
depend upon the translator's words, then there should be no disagree-
ment between the translator and jurors fluent in Spanish."' 5 The fact
that this proposition may be only an ideal was recently pointed out by
Florida's Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, appointed in 1989
by the Florida Supreme Court. 86 The commission's findings, which
were scheduled to be formally disclosed in December 1991, in a report
to the Florida Supreme Court, indicate that "trained and certified in-
terpreters are rare, and many judicial circuits have no standards ....
It's often left to individual judges and court administrators to find ca-
pable translators."'1 87 Given the lack of qualified interpreters in Florida,
it would not serve the state's interest in promoting fair trials to exclude
bilingual jurors, nor would it serve the state's interest to seat bilingual
jurors with a proviso that they totally disregard the witness' testimony
in Spanish in favor of the interpreter's translation. Particularly where
there is concern over the quality of the interpreters, it is essential to
seat bilingual jurors, who will listen to both the witness' testimony and
the interpreter's translation, so that discrepancies can be brought to the
court's attention in an effort to serve justice by having the jury decide
181. Id. at 777.
182. Id. at 778.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 779 ("Inevitably, due to the spontanaeity [sic] of an interpreter's
translation or the lack of an exact translation of a word, it is possible that the inter-
preter may not choose the best word possible, thus causing a deviation in the intended
communication to the jury.").
185. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 628 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
186. See Study: Race Bias Pervades Courts, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 1991, at
A l, col. 5.
187. Id. at A25, col. 1.
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on the basis of non-erroneous evidence.
The dissent in Hernandez also noted a third reason why the prose-
cutor's statement was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case: if the
prosecutor's concern regarding the jurors' ability to follow the court's
instructions was valid, a challenge for cause could have been made. 188
The dissent reasoned that since the prosecutor did not make such a
challenge, he must have been unable to document his concern.' 89 The
dissent further reasoned that if the prosecutor's concern could not be
documented by the record, it amounted to a "frivolous or illegitimate
[justification which] should not suffice to overcome the prima facie
case."
9 0
The dissent conceded that each reason, considered separately,
might not be grounds for rejecting the prosecutor's facially race-neutral
explanation as being insufficient.' 9 ' The concession, however, was not
due to the lack of strength or validity of each reason, but rather to the
dissent's acknowledgement that the positions advanced by its opinion
were not acceptable to the majority. For example, on the issue of dispa-
rate impact on Latinos, the dissent focused on the objective result, the
disparate impact, to conclude that the prosecutor's facially race-neutral
explanation was simply "a proxy for a discriminatory practice,"' 92
therefore, insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination.' 93 Although a valid argument, the dissent recognized that
the majority would not accept its reasoning, based on the Court's long-
standing position that disparate impact alone is insufficient to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause. 94 Thus, the dissent's first
reason, by itself, would not be grounds for rejecting the state's
explanation.
Similarly, the dissent conceded its second argument, regarding
nondiscriminatory alternatives, because the Court has continued to
hold that the availability of nondiscriminatory means is but one factor
to be taken into account when determining whether or not the state
intended to discriminate. 195 The third argument, that if the prosecutor's
reason was valid it could have supported a challenge for cause, is gain-
188. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1876-77.
191. Id. at 1877.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
195. See supra note 163.
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ing strength in the movement to do away with peremptory challenges in
the wake of Batson.19 It is a powerful argument, and perhaps in the
final analysis, it will be the solution to the "Batson dilemma," for de-
spite the oft-quoted phrase from Batson that "the prosecutor's explana-
tion need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause," 197 most judges and lawyers are still struggling to understand
Batson's requirement of a quasi explanation. But for now, as long as
the peremptory system still exists, the dissent's third reason cannot pre-
vail, because it directly contradicts the lighter requirements set forth in
Batson to examine the prosecutor's statement. 19
Although each of the reasons advanced by the dissent might not,
on its own, be grounds for rejecting the prosecutor's explanation, the
dissent concluded that the combined weight of the reasons supports a
rejection as a matter of law. 199
IV. CONCLUSION
Using the Batson analysis, there are two ways in which a peremp-
tory challenge could be declared a violation of the equal protection
clause: either the challenge is a per se violation, i.e., on its face the
prosecutor's explanation is that he or she intended to discriminate
based on the juror's race or national origin, or it is a violation because
it fails, by way of pretext or insufficiency, to overcome a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 00 The ruling on the per se issue was
a thoughtful, sensitive one, which attempted to find a middle ground
between equating race with language on one extreme for purposes of
equal protection analysis, and on the other extreme, signalling that the
Court would condone discrimination based on language.
However, its decision on whether the trial court erred in determin-
ing that the explanation was not pretextual, nor insufficient, and was
thus not a violation of the equal protection clause under part three of
the Batson analysis, was questionable. This decision involved a ruling
on the other issue in the case-the amount of deference to be accorded
the trial court in deciding whether or not it erred in accepting the pros-
ecutor's explanation. The Court's ruling on this issue was not as astute
196. See supra notes 68, 72, and 73.
197. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
198. See supra text accompanying note 197.
199. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1877.
200. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
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as its per se ruling. When the Court ruled that a trial court's finding of
fact on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent should be ac-
corded great deference on appeal,"' it failed to recognize the potential
for abuse in exercising peremptory challenges against bilingual Latinos.
Had the Court decided this case on the basis of whether or not the trial
court took into account all relevant factors, it might have arrived at the
conclusion reached by the dissent.
However, the import of this decision is for future cases. Until the
United States Supreme Court sets guidelines similar to those set by
some states,2"2 cases tried in federal district courts and in state courts
not having such guidelines will be reviewed on appeal under the clearly
erroneous standard, but with very little analysis regarding the trial
court's finding of fact as to discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges. The effect will be rulings which are inconsistent because
each was a "rubber stamp" given in deference to a trial court which
was not obliged to make its findings under any consistent set of guide-
lines. 'Worse, by simply deferring, rather than analyzing for clear error
according to an authoritative body of law, the Supreme Court or state
appellate courts could be setting legal precedent which has no basis in
fact or in law.
Fortunately, cases arising in Florida are governed by Florida v.
Slappy ,203 which gives direction to the trial court and gives the appel-
late courts a basis upon which to review for clear error. In addition,
Justice Kennedy's warning that, in some cases, language proficiency
will be treated as a surrogate for race,204 should serve as notice that the
Court by no means gave blanket approval to peremptory challenges of
bilinguals in cases involving testimony given through an interpreter. °5
201. Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991).
202. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala. 1987); Florida v.
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
203. 522 So. 2d at 22.
204. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872-73; see infra note 205.
205. The Court went to great lengths to emphasize that its holding was limited
to the facts of the Hernandez case, stating explicitly that each case must be reviewed
on its own merits based on all the circumstances of that case. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at
1873. Justice Kennedy was referring to this case-by-case method when he stated,
[olur decision today does not imply that exclusion of bilinguals from jury
service is wise, or even that it is constitutional in all cases . . . .It may
well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that profi-
ciency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a sur-
rogate for race under an equal protection analysis.
Id. at 1872.
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Thus, there are sufficient safeguards in Florida, at least, so that the
abuses feared by defense attorneys and Latino groups in the wake of
the Hernandez decision, will not come to pass.
Ronnie R. Savar
Thus, the ultimate message of the Court was that race would not be expanded to
include language proficiency as a general rule, but that if the circumstances of a partic-
ular case indicated, for that case, that language should be treated as a surrogate for
race, then the exclusion of a bilingual juror for a language-based reason would be un-
constitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
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